**درس روش تحقیق**

**بهار 1395-نسخه ششم**

هر ارائه 20 دقیقه خواهد بود (اسلایدهای اصلی کمتر از 10اسلاید می توانید اسلاید ذخیره داشته باشید). کلاس‌ها از ساعت 15 الی 16:30 است. تنها حضور در کلاسی که ارائه دارید اجباری است چراکه موضوعات هر کلاس تقریبا به یکدیگر مرتبط است. در ارائه به سوالات زیر باید پاسخ بدهید:

* سوال این مقاله چیست؟ و چرا اهمیت دارد؟ فرضیه این مقاله چیست؟
* نوآوری و ارزش افزوده مقاله چیست؟ این ارزش افزوده چرا در ادبیات قابل توجه است؟
* نزدیک ترین مقاله به این مقاله کدام مقاله است و فرق مهم این دو مقاله چیست؟
* از چه روشی برای پاسخ به سوالات بهره برده است؟ چرا این روش برای این سوال مناسب است؟ آیا روش دیگری را می توانید شما پیشنهاد کنید؟
* چگونه از این روش نتیجه نهایی را استنتاج کرده است؟

زمان‌های مهم درس:

* تحویل خلاصه هر مقاله قبل از ارائه آن مقاله
* تحویل مرور ادبیات و درخ ادبیات 21 اردیبهشت به صورت پرینت شده تحویل خانم خوی وندی گردد.
* تحویل پروپزال 29 تیرماه تحویل خانم خوی وندی گردد.

زمان بندی ارائه‌ها:

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| نام و نشان | ارائه اول | ارائه دوم | ارائه سوم | ارائه چهارم |
| فروغ فر | 9 اسفند | 15 فروردین | 29 فروردین | 12 اردیبهشت |
| صداقت کیش | 9 اسفند | 15 فروردین | 29 فروردین | 12 اردیبهشت |
| هاشم زاده | 9 اسفند | 15 فروردین | 29 فروردین | 12 اردیبهشت |
| رفیع زاده | 11 اسفند | 17 فروردین | 31 فروردین | 14 اردیبهشت |
| گودینی | 11 اسفند | 17 فروردین | 31 فروردین | 14 اردیبهشت |
| راهی | 11 اسفند | 17 فروردین | 31 فروردین | 14 اردیبهشت |
| کاظم | 16 اسفند | 22 فروردین | 5 اردیبهشت | 19 اردیبهشت |
| زندی | 16 اسفند | 22 فروردین | 5 اردیبهشت | 19 اردیبهشت |
| اقدسی | 16 اسفند | 22 فروردین | 5 اردیبهشت | 19 اردیبهشت |
| قادری | 18 اسفند | 24 فروردین | 7 اردیبهشت | 21 اردیبهشت |
| تحویلیان | 18 اسفند | 24 فروردین | 7 اردیبهشت | 21 اردیبهشت |
| فروزنده | 18 اسفند | 24 فروردین | 7 اردیبهشت | 21 اردیبهشت |

زمانیکه چهار ارائه شما تمام شد، یک هفته استراحت است و از سه شنبه 4 خرداد جلسات تک نفره خواهیم داشت و پیشرفت تحقیق شما را با یکدیگر بحث خواهیم کرد. جلسات مشابه در ابتدای تیرماه خواهیم داشت. لذا من انتظار دارم شما دو فرم پیشرفت تحقیق را تکمیل کنیم. در ملاقاتی که در هفته اول خرداد داریم من خلاصه مقالاتی که ارسال کردید را تصحیح شده تقدیم می کنم و همچنین عناوین مقالات و دسته بندی مقالات در مرور ادبیات را بحث خواهیم کرد. از آنجائیکه برنامه‌ریزی این درس تقریبا مشخص شده است، نمره‌دهی درس به ترتیب زیر تقدیم می‌گردد.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| عنوان | تاریخ تحویل | نمره |
| خلاصه 4 مقاله | در موعد ارائه | 1 نمره |
| ارائه 4 مقاله |  | 1 نمره |
| مرور ادبیات | 25 تیرماه | 5 نمره |
| پروپزال | 20 مرداد | 4 نمره |
| گزارش پیشرفت | 4 خرداد  6 تیر | 1 نمره |

مشابه قرار گذشته اگر شما بتوانید پروپزال خود را قبل از انتهای تیرماه دفاع کنید، کل نمره این بخش از درس به شما اختصاص خواهد یافت. اگر پروپزال را تا قبل از انتهای مرداد دفاع کنید نمره شما در ضریب 1.3 ضرب خواهد شد.

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