CE 817 - Advanced Network Security
Worms II

Lecture 10

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Acknowledgments: Some of the slides are fully or partially obtained from other sources. Reference is noted on the bottom of each slide, when the content is fully obtained from another source. Otherwise a full list of references is provided on the last slide.
Introduction

- Problem: how to react quickly to worms?
- CodeRed 2001
  - Infected ~360,000 hosts within 11 hours
- Sapphire/Slammer (376 bytes) 2002
  - Infected ~75,000 hosts within 10 minutes
The SQL Slammer Worm: 30 Minutes After “Release”

- Infections doubled every 8.5 seconds
- Spread 100X faster than Code Red
- At peak, scanned 55 million hosts per second.

[Wang05]
Network Effects Of The SQL Slammer Worm

• At the height of infections
  • Several ISPs noted significant bandwidth consumption at peering points
  • Average packet loss approached 20%
  • South Korea lost almost all Internet service for period of time
  • Financial ATMs were affected
  • Some airline ticketing systems overwhelmed
Current Detection Methods

- Typically an IDS helps the administrators
- Isolation of the worm
- Security experts create the worms signature
- Updates to antivirus and network filtering software
- Correct but expensive, slow and manual procedure.
- Reaction time should be max 60 sec to contain a worm
Background

- CodeRed in 2001
  - Repair rate: 2% per day - With media attention
  - Automatic Intervention is necessary
- Signature-based models can halt all matching network activity, when the worm’s signature is created
Worm Detection

- Three classes of methods
  - Scan detection
  - Honeypots
  - Behavioral techniques
Scan Detection

• Look for unusual frequency and distribution of address scanning
  • Here is where a telescope would be useful

• Limitations
  • Not suited to worms that spread in a non-random fashion (i.e. emails, IM, P2P apps)
    • Based on a target list
    • Spread topologically
Scan Detection

- More limitations
  - Detects infected sites
  - Does not produce a signature
Honeypots

- Monitored idle hosts with untreated vulnerabilities
  - Used to isolate worms

- Limitations
  - Manual extraction of signatures
  - Depend on quick infections

[Wang05]
Behavioral Detection

- Looks for unusual system call patterns
  - Sending a packet from the same buffer containing a received packet
  - Can detect slow moving worms

- Limitations
  - Needs application-specific knowledge
  - Cannot infer a large-scale outbreak
Characterization

• Process of analyzing and identifying a new worm
• Current approaches
  • Use a priori vulnerability signatures
  • Automated signature extraction

[Wang05]
Vulnerability Signatures

• Example
  • Slammer Worm
    • UDP traffic on port 1434 that is longer than 100 bytes (buffer overflow)
• Can be deployed before the outbreak
  • Can only be applied to well-known vulnerabilities
Some Automated Signature Extraction Techniques

• Allows worm to infect decoy programs
  • Extracts the modified regions of the decoy
  • Uses heuristics to identify invariant code strings across infected instances
Some Automated Signature Extraction Techniques

- Limitation
  - Assumes the presence of a worm in a controlled environment
Containment

- Mechanism used to deter the spread of an active worm
  - Host quarantine
    - Via IP ACLs on routers or firewalls
  - String-matching
  - Connection throttling
    - On all outgoing connections
Earlybird

• Automatic detection and containment of new worms
• Content Sifting:
  • Content of worm traffic is invariant
  • Worm spread dynamics atypical of Internet Applications
• Frequently repeated and widely dispersed content strings -> new worm
Defining Worm Behavior

- Content invariance
  - Portions of a worm are invariant (e.g. the decryption routine)
- Content prevalence
  - Appears frequently on the network
- Address dispersion
  - Distribution of destination addresses more uniform to spread fast
Finding Worm Signatures

• Traffic pattern is sufficient for detecting worms
  • Relatively straightforward
  • Extract all possible substrings
  • Raise an alarm when
    • FrequencyCounter[substring] > threshold1
    • SourceCounter[substring] > threshold2
    • DestCounter[substring] > threshold3
Practical Content Sifting

- Characteristics
  - Small processing requirements
  - Small memory requirements
  - Allows arbitrary deployment strategies

[Wang05]
Estimating Content Prevalence

• Finding the packet payloads that appear at least \( x \) times among the \( N \) packets sent
  • During a given interval
Estimating Content Prevalence

- Given a 1Gbps
- Table[payload]
  - 1 GB table filled in less than 10 seconds
- Table[hash[payload]]
  - 1 GB table filled in 4 minutes
  - Tracking millions of ants to track a few elephants
  - Collisions...false positives

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

Array of counters

Hash(Pink)

stream memory

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

Array of counters

Hash(Green)

packet memory

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

Array of counters

Hash(Green)

packet memory

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

packet memory
Collisions are OK

packet memory

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

Diagram:
- Reached threshold
- Packet memory
- Insert

References:
[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

packet memory

packet1 1

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

packet memory

packet1 1

packet2 1

[Wang05]
Multistage Filters

Stage 1

Stage 2

packet memory

packet1  1

No false negatives!

[Wang05]
Estimating Address Dispersion

• Not sufficient to count the number of source and destination pairs
  • e.g. send a mail to a mailing list
    • Two sources—mail server and the sender
    • Many destinations
• Need to track the distinct source and destination IP addresses
  • For each substring
• Simple list or hash table is too expensive
  • Use Bitmap data structure
Putting It Together

Address Dispersion Table

Content Prevalence Table

- key
- src cnt
- dest cnt

if AD entry exist?
else
update counter

- key
- cnt

update counters

- counters > dispersion threshold?
- report key as suspicious worm

- cnt > prevalence threshold?
- create AD entry

header
payload

substring fingerprints
substring fingerprints

[Singh04]
System Design

- Two major components
  - Sensors
    - Sift through traffic for a given address space
    - Report signatures
  - An aggregator
    - Coordinates real-time updates
    - Distributes signatures
Implementation and Environment

- Written in C and MySQL (5,000 lines)
- rrd-tools library for graphical reporting
- PHP scripting for administrative control
- Prototype executes on a 1.6Ghz AMD Opteron 242 1U Server
  - Linux 2.6 kernel
- Processes 1TB of traffic per day
- Can keep up with 200Mbps of continuous traffic
Content prevalence threshold

- Using a 60 second measurement interval and a whole packet CRC, over 97 percent of all signatures repeat two or fewer times and 94.5 percent are only observed once.
- Using a finer grained content hash or a longer measurement interval increases these numbers even further.
- Default: 3 repetitions

[Singh04]
Address dispersion threshold

- After 10 minutes there are over 1000 signatures with a low dispersion threshold of 2
- Using a threshold of 30, there are only 5 or 6 prevalent strings meeting the dispersion criteria
- Default: 30 sources and 30 destinations
Garbage Collection

- When the timeout is set to 100 seconds, then almost 60 percent of all signatures are garbage collected before a subsequent update.
- Using a timeout of 1000 seconds, this number is reduced to roughly 20 percent of signatures.
- Default: several hours.
### Performance Processing Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component wise breakdown</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabin Fingerprint</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Fingerprint (40 bytes)</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increment (each byte)</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi Stage Filter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test &amp; Increment</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD Table Entry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lookup</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insert</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Packet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header Parsing &amp; First Fingerprint</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-byte processing</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Packet with Flow-Reassembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header Parsing &amp; Flow maintenance</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-byte processing</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Value sampling brings per-byte processing down to 0.042 ms
Performance
Memory Consumption

• Prevalence table. Totals to 2 MB
• Address Dispersion Table utilizes well under 1MB
  • Total less than 4MB
Trace-Based Verification

- Two main sources of false positives
  - 2,000 common protocol headers
    - e.g. HTTP, SMTP
    - Whitelisted
  - SPAM e-mails
  - BitTorrent
    - Many-to-many download

[Wang05]
False Negatives

- So far none
- Detected every worm outbreak
Evasions

- An attacker might evade detection by splitting an invariant string across packets
  - Have fingerprints across packets
- Traffic normalization
  - Remember attacks on IDS
- Polymorphic viruses
  - Semantically equivalent but textually distinct code
  - Invariant decoding routine

[Wang05]
Live Experience with EarlyBird

- Detected precise signatures
  - CodeRed variants
  - MyDoom mail worm
  - Sasser
  - Kibvu.B
Extensions

- Self configuration
- Slow worms
- Variant Content in worms, Compression, VPNs, SSL

[Wang05]
Challenge: Polymorphic Worms

- Polymorphic worms minimize invariant content
  - Encrypted payload

- Polymorphic tools are already available
  - Clet, ADMmutate

Do good signatures for polymorphic worms exist?

Can we generate them automatically?
Good News: Still some invariant content

- **Protocol framing**
  - Needed to make server go down vulnerable code path

- **Overwritten Return Address**
  - Needed to redirect execution to worm code

- **Decryption routine**
  - Needed to decrypt main payload
  - BUT, code obfuscation can eliminate patterns here
Bad News: Previous Approaches Insufficient

- Previous approaches use a common substring
- Longest substring
  - “HTTP/1.1”
  - 93% false positive rate
- Most specific substring
  - “\xff\xbf”
  - .008% false positive rate (10 / 125,301)
What to do?

- No one substring is specific enough
- BUT, there are multiple substrings
  - Protocol framing
  - Value used to overwrite return address
  - (Parts of poorly obfuscated code)
- Our approach: combine the substrings
Goals

• Identify classes of signatures that can:
  • Accurately describe polymorphic worms
  • Be used to filter a high speed network line
  • Be generated automatically and efficiently

• Design and implement a system to automatically generate signatures of these classes
Signature Class (I): Conjunction

- Signature is a set of strings (tokens)
- Flow matches signature if it contains all tokens in the signature
- O(n) time to match (n is flow length)
- Generated signature:
  - “GET” and “HTTP/1.1” and “\r\nHost:” and “\r\nHost:” and “\xff\xbf”
  - .0024% false positive rate (3 / 125,301)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOP slide</th>
<th>Decryption Routine</th>
<th>Decryption Key</th>
<th>Encrypted Payload</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>URL</td>
<td>HTTP/1.1</td>
<td>Random Headers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Host: Payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Part 1 Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Headers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Host: Payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Part 2 Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Headers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Signature Class (II): Token Subsequence

- Signature is an ordered set of tokens
- Flow matches if it contains all the tokens in signature, in the given order
- O(n) time to match (n is flow length)
- Generated signature:
  - GET.*HTTP/1.1.*\r\nHost:.\r\nHost:.\xff\xbf
  - .0008% false positive rate (1 / 125,301)
Experiment: Signature Generation

• How many worm samples do we need?
• Too few samples --> signature is too specific --> false negatives
• Experimental setup
  • Using a 15 day port 80 trace from lab perimeter
  • Innocuous pool: First 5 days (45,111 streams)
  • Suspicious Pool:
    • Using Apache exploit described in paper
    • Non-invariant portions filled with random bytes
• Signature evaluation:
  • False positives: Last 10 days (125,301 streams)
  • False negatives: 1000 generated worm samples
### Signature Generation Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Worm Samples</th>
<th>Conjunction</th>
<th>Subseq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>100% FN</td>
<td>100% FN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 100</td>
<td>0% FN .0024% FP</td>
<td>0% FN .0008% FP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GET . * HTTP/1.1\r\n.*\r
Host: .*/xeel\xb7.*\xb2\xe1e.*\r\nHost: .*/xef\xa3.*\xb8\xf4.*\xb8\xb.*\xe1e.*\xff\xbf

GET . * HTTP/1.1\r\n.*\r
Host: .*\r\nHost: .*\xff\xbf
Acknowledgments/References


- [kuzma] ww.cs.northwestern.edu/~akuzma/classes/CS495-s05/doc/awf.ppt
- [hy558] ww.csd.uoc.gr/~hy558/reports/itsomp_fingerprinting.ppt