Acknowledgments: Some of the slides are fully or partially obtained from other sources. Reference is noted on the bottom of each slide, when the content is fully obtained from another source. Otherwise a full list of references is provided on the last slide.
Software Faults
Software Faults

• Software are developed by humans and therefore are not perfect
Software Faults

- Software are developed by humans and therefore are not perfect
- A human error may introduce a bug (or fault)
Software Faults

• Software are developed by humans and therefore are not perfect
• A human error may introduce a bug (or fault)
• Are all software faults security bugs?
Software Insecurity
Software Insecurity

• A software bug or software fault may be a security bug or vulnerability
  • When the bug is triggered or exploited it compromises the security of the software system
Software Security

• Easy, just write perfect software!
  • Is that actually enough?
Software Security

• Easy, just write perfect software!
  • Is that actually enough?
• Easy, just write perfect software and have perfect users!
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Software Security

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• Easy, just write perfect software, have perfect users, and configure software perfectly!
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Software Security

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• Easy, just write perfect software, have perfect users, and configure software perfectly!
  • Is that actually enough?
• Easy, just write perfect software, have perfect users, configure software perfectly, and use a perfect Operating System!
Software Security

• Easy, just write perfect software, have perfect users, configure software perfectly, use a perfect Operating System, use a perfect hypervisor, run on a system with perfect firmware, run on a system with perfect hardware, …
Really depend on how you look at it
Really depend on how you look at it

Speculative Execution
Really depend on how you look at it
Examples (CVE- 2009-4307)

groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;

/* There are some situations, after shift the value of ’groups_per_flex’ can become zero and division with 0 will result in fixpoint divide exception */

if (groups_per_flex == 0)
    return 1;

flex_group_count = ... / groups_per_flex;

• X86 32bit, shift inst. truncates the shift amount to 5 bits. (32 shift becomes 0)
• PowerPC 32bit, shift inst. truncates the shift amount to 6 bits. (32 shift becomes 1)
• In C, shifting an n-bit integer by n or more bits is undefined behavior.
• Compiler thinks, groups_per_flex will never be zero
  • removed the check when compiling to optimize code
Buffer overflow

- Suppose a web server contains a function:

```c
void func(char *str) {
    char buf[128];
    strcpy(buf, str);
    do-something(buf);
}
```

- When `func()` is called stack looks like:
Buffer overflow

• Suppose a web server contains a function:

```c
void func(char *str) {
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```

• When func() is called stack looks like:

```
[CS 155]
```
Buffer overflow

- What if *str is 136 bytes long?

- After strcpy:

```c
void func(char *str) {
    char buf[128];
    strcpy(buf, str);
    do-something(buf);
}
```
Buffer overflow

• What if *str is 136 bytes long?

• After strcpy:

```c
void func(char *str) {
    char buf[128];
    strcpy(buf, str);
    do-something(buf);
}
```

Problem: no length checking in strcpy()
Other Examples

- Out of bound memory access
- Temporal Memory Safety Violations
- Integer overflow
- .....
## Vulnerabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>CVE-Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HeartBleed</td>
<td>CVE-2014-0160</td>
<td>Affected over 600,000 websites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shellshock</td>
<td>CVE-2014-6271</td>
<td>The impact is anywhere from 20 to 50% of global servers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirty COW</td>
<td>CVE-2016-5195</td>
<td>Affects all Linux-based operating systems including Android</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNOM</td>
<td>CVE-2015-3456</td>
<td>Affected all version of XEN and KVM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>glib GHOST</td>
<td>CVE-2015-0235</td>
<td>A core component used in most Linux distributions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CVE Growth

# CVE's per year/month

Data compiled from MITRE, NVD and Rapid7
Who cares if there are vulnerabilities???
Marketplace for owned machines

Pay-per-install (PPI) services

Source: Cabalerro et al. (www.icir.org/vern/papers/ppi-usesec11.pdf)
Marketplace for owned machines

Pay-per-install (PPI) services

PPI operation:
1. Own victim’s machine
2. Download and install client’s code
3. Charge client

Source: Cabalerro et al. (www.icir.org/vern/papers/ppi-usesec11.pdf)
Marketplace for owned machines

Cost: US - 100-180$ / 1000 machines
Asia - 7-8$ / 1000 machines

Source: Cabalerro et al. (www.icir.org/vern/papers/ppi-usesec11.pdf)
Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

Option 1:  bug bounty programs (many)
- Google Vulnerability Reward Program:  up to $20K
- Microsoft Bounty Program:  up to $100K
- Mozilla Bug Bounty program:  $7500
- Pwn2Own competition:  $15K

Option 2:
- Zero day initiative (ZDI),  iDefense:  $2K – $25K
### Example: Mozilla

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Novel vulnerability and exploit, new form of exploitation or an exceptional vulnerability</th>
<th>High quality bug report with clearly exploitable critical vulnerability</th>
<th>High quality bug report of a critical or high vulnerability</th>
<th>Minimum for a high or critical vulnerability</th>
<th>Medium vulnerability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10,000+$</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$500 - $2500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

**Option 3:** black market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Software</th>
<th>Price Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADOBE READER</td>
<td>$5,000–$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC OSX</td>
<td>$20,000–$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDROID</td>
<td>$30,000–$60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLASH OR JAVA BROWSER PLUG-INS</td>
<td>$40,000–$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICROSOFT WORD</td>
<td>$50,000–$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINDOWS</td>
<td>$60,000–$120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIREFOX OR SAFARI</td>
<td>$60,000–$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHROME OR INTERNET EXPLORER</td>
<td>$80,000–$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOS</td>
<td>$100,000–$250,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andy Greenberg  (Forbes, 3/23/2012 )
Ok, Important. How we find them?
Audit it

- How much does it take to audit all available programs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>files</th>
<th>blank</th>
<th>comment</th>
<th>code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12066</td>
<td>3945</td>
<td>46676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2027</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>7189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ Header</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>6891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- It took 2 years to audit TrueCrypt (2013-2015)
- German Government + Cryptographers and Security researchers conducted the audit
- Audit finished April 2015
- CVE-2015-7358 and CVE-2015-7359 discovered September 2015 by Google Zero Project!
Too much code!

Lines of code per Kernel version

Lines of Code
Too much code!

Almost 500 years and with no guarantees!
Too much code !!!

- 111 billion lines of new software code is created every year

- Each bug found by hackers first, will lead to a disaster

- Hackers are interested in Exploitable bugs!

- Number of Vulnerabilities per year; IBM Report 2017
Solutions

- Redevelop Linux Kernel and all other programs
  - Not feasible

---

[Kernel Version]

[Wikipedia]
DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge

• “Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) is a contest to build high-performance computers capable of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities
• Announced in 2013, and Final Contest held in 2016

• Teams build “Cyber Reasoning Systems” (CRS)
• CRS finds “Proof of Vulnerability” (POV) (automatically exploit)
• CRS fixes vulnerability
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Who participated in CGC?

• 104 teams originally registered in 2014
• 28 teams made it through to CGC Qualifying Event
• 7 teams headed to CGC finals.

⭐ **CodeJitsu**: University of California, Berkeley
⭐ **ForAllSecure**: ForAllSecure startup from Carnegie Mellon University
⭐ **TECHx**: GrammaTech, Inc. and University of Virginia
⭐ **CSDS**: University of Idaho
⭐ **DeepRed**: Raytheon Company
⭐ **disekt**: CTF Team
⭐ **Shellphish**: University of California, Santa Barbara
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What happens if we don’t find them all?
Multiple layers of defense

• How to mitigate the vulnerabilities?
  • run-time protection
• How do we look for vulnerabilities?
  • Program analysis
• How do we refrain from one vulnerabilities causing another one?
  • Better Architectures
• How do we refrain from future vulnerabilities?
  • Better programming languages
High level course view

• Classic attacks
  • Buffer Overflow, Format String, ROP, etc.
• Run-time protection
  • Taint tracking, CFI, etc.
• Code analysis
  • Static analysis, Symbolic execution, Fuzzing
• Architecture
  • Sandboxing, VMs, Isolation, Trusted computing
• Web
  • Native client, App isolation, WebAssembly
• Usability
A quick review of some of the very basics!
Application Model
Application Model
Application Model

Diagram: Application Model

- Environment
- Application
Application Model

- Environment
- Application

OS
Application Model
Application Model
Application Model

- Process
- Environment
- Application
- Network
- OS
- File System
Application Model

- Process
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- OS
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- Terminal
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Application Model

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[Adam Doupe]
Application Model

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Stages in which there could be a vulnerability
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- Design vulnerabilities
  - Flaws in the overall logic of the application
    - Lack of authentication and/or authorization checks
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    - Unexpected interleaving of events
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- Implementation vulnerabilities
  - Application is not able to correctly handle unexpected events
    - Unexpected input, Unexpected errors/exceptions
    - Unexpected interleaving of events
- Deployment vulnerabilities
  - Incorrect/faulty deployment/configuration of the application
    - Installed with more privileges than the ones it should have
    - Installed on a system that has a faulty security policy and/or mechanism (e.g., a file that should be read-only is actually writeable)
The Life of an Application
The Life of an Application

- Author writes code in high-level language
The Life of an Application

- Author writes code in high-level language
- The application is translated in some executable form and saved to a file
  - Interpretation vs. compilation
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The Life of an Application

- Author writes code in high-level language
- The application is translated in some executable form and saved to a file
  - Interpretation vs. compilation
- The application is loaded in memory
- The application is executed
- The application terminates
Interpretation

• The program is passed to an interpreter
  • The program might be translated into an intermediate representation
    • Python byte-code
Interpretation

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Interpretation

• The program is passed to an interpreter
  • The program might be translated into an intermediate representation
    • Python byte-code
  • Each instruction is parsed and executed
  • In most interpreted languages it is possible to generate and execute code dynamically
    • Bash: eval <string>
    • Python: eval(<string>)
    • JavaScript: eval(<string>)
    • ...
  • ...
Compilation
Compilation

- The preprocessor expands the code to include definitions, expand macros
  - GNU/Linux: The C preprocessor is cpp
Compilation

• The preprocessor expands the code to include definitions, expand macros
  • GNU/Linux: The C preprocessor is cpp
• The compiler turns the code into architecture-specific assembly
  • GNU/Linux: The C compiler is gcc
    • gcc -S prog.c will generate the assembly
    • Use gcc’s -m32 option to generate 32-bit assembly
Compilation
Compilation

• The assembler turns the assembly into a binary object
  • GNU/Linux: The assembler is as
    • A binary object contains the binary code and additional metadata
      • Relocation information about things that need to be fixed once the code and the data are loaded into memory
      • Information about the symbols defined by the object file and the symbols that are imported from different objects
    • Debugging information
Compilation
Compilation

• The linker combines the binary object with libraries, resolving references that the code has to external objects (e.g., functions) and creates the final executable
  • GNU/Linux: The linker is ld
  • Static linking is performed at compile-time
  • Dynamic linking is performed at run-time
Compilation

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- Most common executable formats:
  - GNU/Linux: ELF
  - Windows: PE
The ELF File Format
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- ELF files are of four types:
  - Relocatable: need to be fixed by the linker before being executed
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  - Shared: shared libraries with the appropriate linking information
  - Core: core dumps created when a program terminated with a fault
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- Tools: readelf, file
The ELF File Format

- A program is seen as a collection of segments by the loader and as a collection of sections by the compiler/linker.
- A segment is usually made of several sections.
- The segment structure is defined in the Program Header Table.
- The section structure is defined in the Section Header Table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magic number</th>
<th>Addressing info</th>
<th>File type</th>
<th>Arch type</th>
<th>Entry point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program header pos</td>
<td>Section header pos</td>
<td>Header size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size and number of entries in program header</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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- Also known as the “EXE” format
- The header contains a number of relocation entries that are used at loading time to “fix” the addresses (this procedure is called rebasing)
  - Programs are written as if they were always loaded at address 0
  - The program is actually loaded in different points in memory
x86 Registers
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- Registers represent the local variables of the processor
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- There are four 32-bit general purpose registers
  - eax/ax, ebx/bx, ecx/cx, edx/cx
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  • Loop counter: `ecx`
  • I/O operations: `edx`
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  - Pointer to data: ebx
  - Loop counter: ecx
  - I/O operations: edx
x86 Registers

[Diagram showing x86 registers: eax, ah, al, ax, esi, si]
x86 Registers

- Two registers are used for high-speed memory transfer operations
  - esi/si (source), edi/di (destination)
**x86 Registers**

- Two registers are used for high-speed memory transfer operations
  - esi/si (source), edi/di (destination)
- There are several 32-bit special purpose registers
  - esp/sp: the stack pointer
  - ebp/bp: the frame pointer
x86 Registers
x86 Registers

- Segment registers: cs, ds, ss, es, fs, gs
  - Used to select segments (e.g., code, data, stack)
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• The instruction pointer: eip
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  • Cannot be read or set explicitly
  • It is modified by jump and call/return instructions
  • Can be read by executing a call and checking the value pushed on the stack
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• Floating point units and mmx/xmm registers
Data Sizes
Data Sizes
x86 Assembly Language
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• (Slightly) higher-level language than machine language
x86 Assembly Language

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• Program is made of:
  • directives: commands for the assembler
  • .data identifies a section with variables
  • instructions: actual operations
    • jmp 0x08048f3f
x86 Assembly Language

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- Program is made of:
  - directives: commands for the assembler
  - .data identifies a section with variables
  - instructions: actual operations
    - jmp 0x08048f3f
- Two possible syntaxes, with different ordering of the operands!
  - AT&T syntax (objdump, GNU Assembler)
    - mnemonic source, destination
  - DOS/Intel syntax (Microsoft Assembler, Nasm, IDA Pro)
    - mnemonic destination, source
  - In gdb can be set using: set disassembly-flavor intel/att
Data Definition
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- Constants
  - Hexadecimal numbers start with 0x
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- Data objects are defined in a data segment using the syntax
  - `label type data1, data2, ...`
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• Types can be
  • DB: Byte
  • DW: Word (16 bits)
  • DD: Double word (32 bits)
  • DQ: Quad word (64 bits)
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- For example:
Data Definition

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- For example:

  .data
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  - DB: Byte
  - DW: Word (16 bits)
  - DD: Double word (32 bits)
  - DQ: Quad word (64 bits)
- For example:

```assembly
.data
  myvar DD 0x12345678, 0x23456789 # Two 32-bit values
```
Data Definition

• Constants
  • Hexadecimal numbers start with 0x
• Data objects are defined in a data segment using the syntax
  • label     type     data1, data2, ...
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  bar      DW  0x1234    # 16-bit data object
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• For example:

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  myvar DD 0x12345678, 0x23456789 # Two 32-bit values
  bar DW 0x1234 # 16-bit data object
  mystr DB "foo", 0 # Null-terminated string
Addressing Memory
Addressing Memory

• Memory access is composed of width, base, index, scale, and displacement
  • Base: starting address of reference
  • Index: offset from base address
  • Scale: Constant multiplier of index
  • Displacement: Constant base
  • Width: (address suffix)
    • size of reference (b: byte, s: short, w: word, l: long, q: quad)
• Address = base + index*scale + displacement
  • AT&T Syntax —> displacement(base, index, scale)
• Example:
  • movl -0x20(%eax, %ecx, 4), %edx
Addressing Memory
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  • copies the contents of the memory pointed by ebp - 8 into eax
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  • copies the value 0x804a0e4 into ebx
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  - moves the contents of eax into the memory at address edx + ecx * 2
- movl $0x804a0e4, %ebx
  - copies the value 0x804a0e4 into ebx
- movl (0x804a0e4), %eax
  - copies the content of memory at address 0x804a0e4 into eax
Instruction Classes
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- Data transfer
  - mov, xchg, push, pop
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  - add, sub, imul, mul, idiv, div, inc, dec
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• Binary arithmetic
  • add, sub, imul, mul, idiv, div, inc, dec

• Logical
  • and, or, xor, not
Instruction Classes
Instruction Classes

• Control transfer
  • jmp, call, ret, int, iret
  • Values can be compared using the cmp instruction
    • cmp src, dest # subtracts src from dest without saving the result
    • Various eflags bits are set accordingly
  • jne (ZF=0), je (ZF=1), jae (CF=0), jge (SF=OF), …
• Control transfer can be direct (destination is a constant) or indirect (the destination address is the content of a register)
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- Misc
  - nop
Invoking System Calls
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- Linux/x86
  - int 0x80
    - eax contains the system call number
int main()
{
    printf("Hello, World!");
    return 0;
}

syscall(4, 1, "hello, world!\n", 12);
int main()
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}

syscall(4, 1, "hello, world!
", 12);
Hello World!

.data
hw:

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.data
hw:
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Hello World!

```c
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hw:
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Hello World!

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[Adam Doupe]
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Program Loading and Execution
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• The instruction pointer is set to the location specified as the start address
• Execution begins
Acknowledgments/References (1/2)

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