

# https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs155

**CS155** 

# **Computer Security**

### Course overview

Acknowledgments: Lecture slides are from the Computer Security course thought by Dan Boneh at Stanford University. When slides are obtained from other sources, a a reference will be noted on the bottom of that slide. A full list of references is provided on the last slide.

# The computer security problem


- Lots of buggy software
- Social engineering is very effective
- Money can be made from finding and exploiting vulns.
  - 1. Marketplace for vulnerabilities
  - 2. Marketplace for owned machines (PPI)
  - 3. Many methods to profit from owned machines

### Lots of vulnerability disclosures (2015)

	Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1	Mac Os X	Apple	OS	<u>385</u>
2	Iphone Os	Apple	OS	<u>376</u>
3	Flash Player	Adobe	Application	<u>313</u>
4	Air Sdk	Adobe	Application	<u>246</u>
5	AIR	Adobe	Application	<u>246</u>
6	Air Sdk & Compiler	Adobe	Application	<u>246</u>
7	Internet Explorer	Microsoft	Application	<u>231</u>
8	<u>Chrome</u>	Google	Application	<u>187</u>
9	<u>Firefox</u>	<u>Mozilla</u>	Application	<u>178</u>
10	Windows Server 2012	Microsoft	OS	<u>155</u>
11	Ubuntu Linux	<u>Canonical</u>	OS	<u>152</u>
12	Windows 8.1	Microsoft	OS	<u>151</u>


#### source: www.cvedetails.com/top-50-products.php?year=2015

### Vulnerable applications being exploited



Source: Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015

# Mobile malware (Nov. 2013 - Oct. 2014)



The rise of mobile banking Trojans (Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2014

Dan Boneh



### Introduction

# Sample attacks

#### Why own machines:

1. IP address and bandwidth stealing

Attacker's goal: look like a random Internet user

Use the IP address of infected machine or phone for:


- Spam (e.g. the storm botnet) Spamalytics: 1:12M pharma spams leads to purchase 1:260K greeting card spams leads to infection
- Denial of Service: Services: 1 hour (20\$), 24 hours (100\$)
- Click fraud (e.g. Clickbot.a)

Why own machines:

2. Steal user credentials and inject ads

keylog for banking passwords, web passwords, gaming pwds.

Example: SilentBanker (and many like it)




# Lots of financial malware

- 1 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre
- 2 Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot
- 3 Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro
- 4 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Shiotob
- 5 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banbra
- 6 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Caphaw
- 7 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken
- 8 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher
- 9 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba
- 10 Trojan-Banker.JS.Agent

- size: 3.5 KB
- spread via email attachments
- also found on home routers

#### Source: Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015

### Users attacked: stats



≈ 300,000 users worldwide

A worldwide problem

Source: Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2015

### Why own machines: 3. Ransomware

- 1 Trojan-Ransom.HTML.Agent
- 2 Trojan-Ransom.JS.Blocker
- 3 Trojan-Ransom.JS.InstallExtension
- 4 Trojan-Ransom.NSIS.Onion
- 5 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl
- 6 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptodef
- 7 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Snocry
- 8 Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter
- 9 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod
- 10 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade

#### CryptoWall (2014-)

- targets Windows
- spread by spam emails

≈ 200,000 machines in 2015

#### A worldwide problem.

### Why own machines: 4. Spread to isolated systems

Example: Stuxtnet

Windows infection  $\Rightarrow$ 

Siemens PCS 7 SCADA control software on Windows =


Siemens device controller on isolated network

More on this later in course

# Server-side attacks

- Financial data theft: often credit card numbers
  - Example: Target attack (2013), ≈ 140M CC numbers stolen
  - Many similar (smaller) attacks since 2000
- Political motivation:
  - Aurora, Tunisia Facebook (Feb. 2011), GitHub (Mar. 2015)
- Infect visiting users

# Types of data stolen (2012-2015)



Source: California breach notification report, 2015

# Example: Mpack

- PHP-based tools installed on compromised web sites
  - Embedded as an iframe on infected page
  - Infects browsers that visit site
- Features
  - management console provides stats on infection rates
  - Sold for several 100\$
  - Customer care can be purchased, one-year support contract
- Impact: 500,000 infected sites (compromised via SQL injection)
   Several defenses: e.g. Google safe browsing

# Insider attacks: example

Hidden trap door in Linux (nov 2003)

- Allows attacker to take over a computer
- Practically undetectable change (uncovered via CVS logs)

#### Inserted line in wait4()

if ((options == (\_WCLONE|\_WALL)) && (current->uid = 0))
 retval = -EINVAL;


Looks like a standard error check, but ...

See: http://lwn.net/Articles/57135/

# Many more examples

- Access to SIPRnet and a CD-RW: 260,000 cables ⇒
  Wikileaks
- SysAdmin for city of SF government. Changed passwords, locking out city from router access
- Inside logic bomb took down 2000 UBS servers
  - •
  - •

### Can security technology help?



Source: California breach notification report, 2015



### Introduction

# The Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

# Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

**Option 1:** bug bounty programs (many)

- Google Vulnerability Reward Program: up to \$20K
- Microsoft Bounty Program: up to \$100K
- Mozilla Bug Bounty program: \$7500
- Pwn2Own competition: \$15K

### Option 2:

• Zero day initiative (ZDI), iDefense: \$2K - \$25K

# Example: Mozilla


Novel vulnerability and exploit, new form of exploitation or an exceptional vulnerability	High quality bug report with clearly exploitable critical vulnerability <sub>1</sub>	High quality bug report of a critical or high vulnerability <sub>2</sub>	Minimum for a high or critical vulnerability <sub>3</sub>	Medium vulnerability
\$10,000+	\$7,500	\$5,000	\$3,000	\$500 - \$2500

# Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

#### **Option 3:** black market

ADOBE READER	\$5,000-\$30,000		
MAC OSX	\$20,000-\$50,000		
ANDROID	\$30,000-\$60,000		
FLASH OR JAVA BROWSER PLUG-INS	\$40,000-\$100,000		
MICROSOFT WORD	\$50,000-\$100,000		
WINDOWS	\$60,000-\$120,000		
FIREFOX OR SAFARI	\$60,000-\$150,000		
CHROME OR INTERNET EXPLORER	\$80,000-\$200,000		
IOS	\$100,000-\$250,000		

Source: Andy Greenberg (Forbes, 3/23/2012)



Source: Cabalerro et al. (www.icir.org/vern/papers/ppi-usesec11.pdf)

### Marketplace for owned machines clients spam keylogger bot US - 100-180\$ / 1000 Cost: **PPI** service machines Asia - 7-8\$ / 1000 machines ms

Source: Cabalerro et al. (www.icir.org/vern/papers/ppi-usesec11.pdf)

### This course

Goals:

• Be aware of exploit techniques

• Learn to defend and avoid common exploits

• Learn to architect secure systems

## This course

Part 1: **basics** (architecting for security)

- Securing apps, OS, and legacy code Isolation, authentication, and access control
- Part 2: Web security (defending against a web attacker)
- Building robust web sites, understand the browser security model
- Part 3: network security (defending against a network attacker)
- Monitoring and architecting secure networks.

Part 4: securing mobile applications

# Don't try this at home !

# Ken Thompson's clever Trojan