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4 **A hybrid BIM and BN-based model to improve the resiliency of hospitals' utility**  
5 **systems in disasters**

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19 **Abstract**

20 The growing number of disasters in recent years has become a significant threat to hospital  
21 buildings' resilience and preparedness. Besides, the stochastic nature of these disasters and the  
22 complexity of the hospital building systems exacerbate the difficulty of making appropriate  
23 decisions during and after disasters. To address the issue, this research proposes a novel model  
24 that utilizes the capabilities of Bayesian Networks (BNs) and Building Information Modeling  
25 (BIM). This model helps decision-makers in hospitals and medical centers measure various  
26 effects of disasters on utility systems and analyze the consequences of their decisions. The  
27 capabilities of the proposed model are tested in the case of a medical gas distribution system  
28 in a hospital building. The findings indicate that using this model brings new insights for  
29 decision-makers into the effects of an earthquake on the medical gas system of the hospital  
30 case. Applying the hybrid BIM and BN model improves the spatial understanding of the utility  
31 systems and expedites the hospital team members' response to critical situations.

32 **Keywords:** Disaster Management, Hospital Utility Systems, Resilience, Bayesian Networks, Building  
33 Information Modeling

## 34 **1. Introduction**

35 Taking appropriate and timely responses during and after disasters plays a crucial role in  
36 preventing human and financial losses (Choi et al., 2018). In recent years, a large amount of  
37 capital has been lost in critical infrastructures due to the lack of such timely control measures  
38 (Gencer, 2013). Health infrastructures are of particular importance in the socio-economic and  
39 psychological recovery of injured people (Mulyasari et al., 2013) and should efficiently provide  
40 medical services to its patients in a safe environment for their personnel and equipment (Djalali  
41 et al., 2014). Increasing the resilience of a hospital depends on expanding its adaptive capacity  
42 by improving the decision-making process during crucial moments (WHO, 2015). Munasinghe  
43 & Matsui (2019) have shown that despite the WHO's emphasis on enhancing hospital  
44 preparedness for disasters, many are still unprepared. Weaknesses in disaster management in  
45 hospitals may include ambiguities in personnel's roles and responsibilities, poor  
46 communication, lack of optimal planning, and low-quality training (Paganini et al., 2016).  
47 Decision-makers in this discipline often face a shortage of relevant knowledge and experience  
48 to deal with unexpected events (Zhou et al., 2018), which can seriously affect the functionality  
49 of the whole healthcare system (Fallah-Aliabadi et al., 2020).

50 Disasters occur at uncertain times and places, with unknown impacts (Lin et al., 2018).  
51 Furthermore, the decision-makers usually confront different types of disasters simultaneously  
52 with a series of effects requiring proportionate responses (Choi et al., 2018). Uncertainty,  
53 diversity, interrelated processes, and a large number of interdependent elements complicate the  
54 decision-making process in the healthcare systems during and after disasters (Wachs et al.,  
55 2016). Past research has investigated the application of Bayesian Networks (BNs) in disaster  
56 management to address the mentioned issues. BNs are powerful tools with probabilistic

57 graphical models based on causal relationships for the decision-making process in high  
58 uncertainty situations (Constantinou et al., 2015).

59 Another controversial aspect of disaster response management is the large amount of data  
60 originated from various sources used in the decision-making process. People who are  
61 responsible for crisis management are generally under considerable stress to make immediate  
62 and effective decisions (Dusse et al., 2016). Concentrating on trivial data and ignoring the  
63 proper flow of information due to the extensive data produced can lead to inaccurate  
64 conclusions in the disaster (Sarvari et al., 2019). Based on the definition of the National  
65 Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS, 2019), "Building Information Modeling (BIM) is a digital  
66 representation of physical and functional characteristics of a facility. A BIM is a shared  
67 knowledge resource for information about a facility forming a reliable basis for decisions  
68 during its lifecycle, defined as existing from earliest conception to demolition". In this  
69 perspective, BIM can help decision-makers in critical junctures identify and locate problems  
70 and determine the hazards through its visual interface (Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012).

71 This research aims to respond to the current need for expedited decision-making during and  
72 after the disasters in the hospital buildings. The proposed model in this research combines the  
73 probabilistic inference engine of the BNs with the BIM models to develop a disaster decision  
74 support tool for the hospital's utility systems. This work provides new insights for decision-  
75 makers in health infrastructures to analyze the probabilistic consequences of disasters and  
76 measure the effects of their decisions through a visualized and probabilistic environment. The  
77 main focus of this study is the hospitals that remain functional during and after the disaster, but  
78 their utility systems might suffer damages, compromising their functionality. First, the  
79 literature related to the research topic was studied. Then different parts of the proposed model  
80 were identified, and essential information about its implementation procedure was discussed.

81 To evaluate the applicability of the proposed model, the researchers implemented it on a  
82 hospital case in the city of Tabriz in Iran and discussed the results under a simulated earthquake  
83 scenario. Finally, the research was concluded by summarizing the contributions, limitations,  
84 and future directions.

85 The remaining part of the paper proceeds in Section 2 by reviewing the related literature.  
86 Section 3 explains the proposed emergency disaster management model. In Section 4, a pilot  
87 implementation is demonstrated, and the findings are discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes  
88 the research and suggests future study directions.

## 89 **2. Literature review**

### 90 **2.1 *Hospitals in disasters***

91 Achour et al. (2011) surveyed 34 hospital facilities in seven countries following nine  
92 earthquakes between 1994 and 2004. Since the regulations have neglected hospital equipment  
93 and utility supplies' resilience, they concluded that the utility damage showed a steady trend  
94 among all hospitals. Disruptions in the operation of utility systems cause medical supply  
95 outages or even evacuation of the building. Kirsch et al. (2010) conducted interviews and field  
96 surveys to study the damage to some hospitals following the 2010 Maule earthquake in Chile.  
97 Despite negligible structural damage, most of these hospitals could not provide adequate  
98 service for up to 7 days after the event due to non-structural damage and utility failures. Despite  
99 having redundant systems, many hospitals did not have an effective disaster management plan  
100 and faced serious decision-making challenges. Using fault-tree analysis, Jacques et al. (2014)  
101 examined the relationship between structural, staff, and staff failures in stricken hospitals in  
102 the 2011 Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand. According to their findings, Christchurch  
103 Hospital lost more than 30% of its functionality immediately after the earthquake. This loss of

104 functionality occurred mainly due to damage to non-structural building components and  
105 equipment, loss of public services, and breakdowns of transportation and re-supply.

106 Hospitals are also at risk of losing their functionality in flood-prone areas. In the 2011 Thailand  
107 flood disaster, the infrastructures of 561 hospitals were severely damaged. The incident led to  
108 severe shortages of resources and hospital staff (Rattanakanlaya et al., 2016). After floods  
109 caused by 2012 Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York, some local hospitals lost their  
110 functionality for a long time after the accident due to severe damage to electrical systems,  
111 emergency and exam rooms, and elevators (Evans, 2012).

## 112 ***2.2 Disaster management efforts in hospitals***

113 Simulating the hospitals for disaster management has been an ongoing and studied topic in  
114 recent literature. Simulation can handle high uncertainty and various factors affecting hospitals'  
115 performance (Gul & Guneri, 2015). To evaluate different resource allocation plans in the  
116 recovery process, Khanmohammadi et al. (2018) used system dynamics simulation to analyze  
117 hospitals' performance in the aftermath of an earthquake. Considering the building, staff,  
118 medicine, technical systems, and medical equipment in their simulation, they quantified  
119 hospitals' resilience to earthquakes. Yi et al. (2010) simulated the hospitals' static and dynamic  
120 characteristics in times of crisis, estimating their capacity to respond to the surge in the number  
121 of patients. The findings of this study facilitate the disaster management planning of healthcare  
122 facilities. Shahverdi et al. (2020) used a discrete event simulation model to investigate the  
123 effects of disasters on hospital staff and their physical spaces. This model considers the hospital  
124 coalitions after the disasters to assess the joint capacity enhancement in resilience  
125 improvement.

126 Some of the disaster management efforts in hospitals have also focused on improving hospital  
127 resilience via mathematical modeling. Using existing data of California hospitals' functionality  
128 in previous earthquakes, Yavari et al. (2010) developed a model for predicting hospitals'

129 performance in post-earthquake conditions. In their model, in addition to the hospital's central  
130 systems, including structural and non-structural systems, lifelines, and personnel, the impact  
131 of external factors such as water and power outages is also considered. With a similar approach,  
132 Vugrin et al. (2015) presented a mathematical optimization model to improve hospitals'  
133 adaptive capacity in the case of a disruption of infrastructure services. Aghapour et al. (2019)  
134 provided a mathematical optimization model for allocating human resources and reconfiguring  
135 spaces and physical facilities. This model helps hospital administrators and decision-makers to  
136 improve their capacity management programs over time.

137 Some studies have begun to evaluate the hospital's preparedness for disasters. One attempt in  
138 this field was the introduction of the hospital safety index, providing a comprehensive checklist  
139 of indices for hospital safety and resilience assessment (WHO, 2019). Implementing this  
140 checklist as a diagnostic tool yields useful information on the hospital's strengths and  
141 weaknesses, which will lead to the actions to improve their resilience. Lim et al. (2020) used  
142 questionnaire-based research among four hospitals in China to conclude that management  
143 preparedness has a significant impact on hospital staff's readiness to respond to disasters. They  
144 pointed out that two factors of contingency leadership and group integration can play a role in  
145 facilitating this relationship.

146 Analyzing the disaster management efforts in hospitals reveals that most studies in this field  
147 have focused on hospital disaster management planning in pre-disaster phases. However, such  
148 approaches have failed to address the immediate response management during and after the  
149 disasters in the hospitals. Most of these studies have also used simulation and mathematical  
150 optimization methods that require a large amount of data collection and often take a time-  
151 consuming process to get results. The resilience of the hospital's internal systems has also been  
152 the focus of a few researchers. Nonetheless, most studies in this area have been related to

153 predicting hospitals' capacity to respond to increased patients and measuring the resource  
154 allocation strategies to increase this capacity.

### 155 **2.3 Bayesian Networks**

156 A great deal of previous research into disaster management has focused on utilizing  
157 probabilistic inference of the BNs. Qiu et al. (2014) built a BN-based model for early warning  
158 of crises, facilitating the alleviation process of the crises impacts. In this model, the cascading  
159 impacts of disasters were modeled by combining single crisis events. Hu et al. (2015) used  
160 dynamic BN's capabilities to analyze disasters' cascading effects among complex and  
161 interconnected systems. BNs helped equipment operators to gain a full understanding of the  
162 relationships between risk factors, identify the causes of abnormal conditions, and adopt  
163 effective corrective measures to deal with them. Wu et al. (2017) used BNs to model  
164 probabilistic relationships between the cause and effect of natural gas pipeline network  
165 accidents. This model provided a realistic analysis of the consequences and was helpful for  
166 decision-makers due to the existing conditional interconnections. Plomaritis et al. (2018) used  
167 the BN to probabilistically model the disaster risk reduction actions in coastal areas as an  
168 alternative to expensive numerical simulations. Here, the use of BNs reduced the effects of  
169 overwash and erosion caused by marine storms. Wu et al. (2020) presented a BN-based model  
170 for predicting and assessing damages caused by floods. They modeled the potential connections  
171 between different effective parameters through the ontology and quantified the uncertainties  
172 through BN.

173 Incorporating expert knowledge into BNs as a solution to overcome the data paucity has been  
174 recently receiving more attention. The BN applications in the literature are mainly mentioned  
175 where historical data is available to estimate the conditional probabilities (Uusitalo, 2007).  
176 However, BNs are proven to be a suitable tool to incorporate expert knowledge where there is  
177 a lack of data for the conditional probability estimations (Kuhnert et al., 2010). Constantinou

178 et al. (2016) incorporated expert knowledge and unstructured data collected from  
179 questionnaires in BN development for medical decision-making. This method can structure  
180 BNs in cases where historical data is limited or difficult to access. Hossain et al. (2019)  
181 developed a BN-based model to quantify the resilience of port infrastructure. Using historical  
182 data and interviews with experts, the authors identified potential threats to port infrastructure  
183 and defined these infrastructures' capacity to absorb, adapt, and restore from these threats. The  
184 expert knowledge and historical data are synthesized into a BN to quantify the mentioned  
185 capacities and their interdependencies and estimate the port infrastructure's resilience.

#### 186 ***2.4 BIM applications in disaster risk reduction***


187 Research efforts on investigating potential BIM applications in disaster management such as  
188 emergency evacuation path planning/finding, indoor localization, fire emergency simulation  
189 and analysis, and facility safety management have been carried out in recent years (Gao &  
190 Pishdad-Bozorgi, 2019). Wang et al. (2014) proposed a framework that creates two-way  
191 communication between the BIM and the users in the evacuation process during a fire and is  
192 useful for increasing the users' awareness about the evacuation process. Chen & Chu (2016)  
193 automatically determined the best route for rescue operations in a disaster by extracting the  
194 building's geometric information from BIM models.

195 BIM visualization has received particular attention in this research area. Charalambos et al.  
196 (2014) estimated the seismic damage to non-structural building systems and displayed it on the  
197 BIM model. Visualization of failure modes provided useful insight for non-specialist building  
198 owners. Cheng et al. (2017) developed a platform to help decision-makers find fire spots and  
199 safe evacuation routes by combining the BIM models' geometry information with the  
200 information received from Bluetooth sensors. This study showed that the 3-Dimensional (3D)  
201 visualization of BIM could help reduce wrong decisions and the confusion created during the

202 crisis. Providakis et al. (2019) used BIM visualization to build a decision-making tool to assess  
203 ground settlement damage to buildings adjacent to underground tunnel workshops.

### 204 **3. The proposed model**

205 Figure 1 represents the schematic view of the hybrid BIM and BN-based emergency disaster  
206 management model for the hospital utility systems. The model architecture is developed in  
207 three layers, including user, front-end, and back-end. The user inputs its observations from the  
208 crises through the front-end layer, representing the model's interactive interface. An  
209 Application Programming Interface (API) is linking the front-end layer to the back-end layer.  
210 The back-end layer maintains the stored knowledge and data. In this layer, the observations are  
211 translated and transferred into the BN's probabilistic inference engine. Then the system state is  
212 predicted using the inference engine. Finally, the probabilistic information turns into the color-  
213 coded 3D BIM objects and is presented to the user in the form of a color-coded BIM model.



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Figure 1. The architecture of the proposed hybrid BIM and BN-based emergency disaster management model

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A four-step method is proposed to configure the back-end layer, including 1) System fragmentation, 2) Risk assessment, 3) BN development, and 4) Integration and visualization.


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Figure 2 represents the configuration steps and their interactions. A detailed explanation

220

regarding the proposed steps is discussed in the following subsections.



221

222

Figure 2. The proposed method to configure the back-end layer of the proposed model

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### 3.1 System fragmentation

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The BIM represents the building's components as 3D objects with specified materials and

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functionality. Therefore, BIM models can provide the risk assessment's requirements by

226

identifying different components' dependencies (Malekitabar et al., 2016). Due to the

227

emergence of the information exchange standards for BIM, engineers can manipulate the

228

collected data in the project's lifecycle. Construction Operations Building Information

229

Exchange (COBie) (East, 2007) and Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) (ISO, 2018) are two

230

standard information exchange formats in the BIM platform. The COBie, represented as a

231

spreadsheet data format, is built based on the IFC to capture and deliver facility management

232

information in a structured manner from an early stage of the construction projects (East, 2007).

233 In this step, the hospital BIM model is captured as an input. Firstly, the BIM model of the  
234 hospital is prepared to incorporate an adequate level of detail, sufficient to contain the target  
235 system's functional information. Then, the COBie spreadsheets of the BIM model is utilized to  
236 break the target system. For the hospital utility fragmentation, the three sheets of "System,"  
237 "Component," and "Connection" in the COBie is exploited. *COBie.Component* contains the  
238 information of every equipment components installed in the building. *COBie.System* describes  
239 how groups of components are organized into relevant categories that deliver specific services  
240 to the facility. *COBie.Connection* contains information about the logical relationship between  
241 components, which can help the facility managers determine the propagation pattern of any  
242 system anomalies (East & Carrasquillo-Mangual, 2012). Here, *COBie.System* helps users  
243 recognize the utility systems of the hospital. Then, *COBie.Component* is utilized to fragmentize  
244 the target system into components. Finally, *COBie.Connection* is used for recognizing the  
245 connections of the components in the target system. The identified components and  
246 connections in the target system are used in the following steps as a basis for BN development.

### 247 **3.2 Risk assessment**

248 The risk assessment starts with "what and how can go wrong?" questions to address the risk  
249 factors' identification and evaluate their consequences (Zou et al., 2017). Failure Modes and  
250 Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been proven to be a reliable tool to incorporate the identification  
251 of the components' potential deviations and evaluate their failure consequences (Wan et al.,  
252 2019). Inspired by this tool, two procedures are considered for risk assessment in the disaster  
253 management model:

- 254 (1) *Deviation identification*: The deviation of the components is a general term used for  
255 any deflection of the components or process from an acceptable range of operation (Hu  
256 et al., 2015). The target system's fragmented components, identified in Step 1, are

257 chosen to be analyzed to identify the deviations. Once a component is chosen, the  
258 deviations are derived by analyzing its possible deflections from the design intentions.  
259 (2) *Consequence evaluation*: Each deviation should be analyzed considering the identified  
260 connections in Step 1 to detect the causes, the probable consequences, and the  
261 propagation of the components' deviation in the system.

262 The two procedures of the risk assessment process are generally conducted based on historical  
263 data of the components' failure and the propagation pattern of the failure in the systems during  
264 the disaster. However, in the case of data shortage, other sources such as the knowledge of the  
265 components' functional criteria available in the scientific literature, design codes, standards,  
266 and technical manuals, the post-disaster reconnaissance reports that are focused on the disaster-  
267 induced failures and propagation patterns, and the tacit knowledge of the domain experts could  
268 be considered as alternative data sources. Utilizing the knowledge of qualified experts can  
269 validate and supplement the information obtained from literature or reconnaissance reports for  
270 the case under study.


### 271 **3.3 BN development**

272 In this step, the results of Step 2 are mapped into a BN. Instantiation of the BN is followed in  
273 two stages:

274 (1) *Coupling risk assessments with BN objects*: The BN object refers to the small block of  
275 BN structure representing a very generic type of uncertain reasoning (Fenton & Neil,  
276 2018). In this study, the cause-consequence BN object is utilized to model the single  
277 component's behavior during and after the disaster. In Figure 3, a schematic view of a  
278 typical cause-consequence object is represented. In this type of object, the causal process  
279 is represented by the "causes," "events," and "consequences" nodes. Measures for  
280 alleviating the effects of "events" and "consequences" are also demonstrated by "controls"

281 and "mitigations" nodes. Instantiation of cause-consequence objects is performed by  
 282 mapping each component's deviations, consequences, and mitigation measures to the  
 283 objects' corresponding nodes. For achieving this goal, the developed technique of  
 284 mapping FMEA to BN is utilized (Brahim et al., 2019).

285 (2) *Integrating objects into a complete BN*: The integration of the fully structured BN  
 286 requires the assembly of the objects. This process is performed by using the identified  
 287 system fragments in step 1. Figure 3 illustrates the assembly scheme of the BN objects  
 288 into a fully structured BN. The developed objects reflect the components' behavior in the  
 289 system; therefore, it is possible to match them with the *COBie.Component* attributes. As  
 290 represented in Figure 3, the objects' dependencies are derived from the  
 291 *COBie.Connection*. By linking the objects, the *COBie.System* and the overall BN of the  
 292 desired system are developed.



293

294

Figure 3. COBie-enabled BN objects assembly

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In this step, the overall BN of the target system is structured by assembling the BN objects.

296

Developing the BN from the objects brings the advantages of (i) speeding up the process of

297 BN development, (ii) increasing the quality of the developed network, and (iii) developing the  
298 libraries of objects which could be used for future studies (Fenton & Neil, 2018).

### 299 **3.4 Integration and Visualization**

300 This step integrates the power of BN probabilistic inference and the visualization capability of  
301 BIM. The BN probabilistic inference (also known as belief updating) is referred to as the  
302 calculation of the probabilities of BN nodes given some observed value of nodes (i.e., evidence)  
303 (Pearl, 2014). The probabilistic inference is used for predicting the state of the target utility  
304 system given any observations of the disaster events. On the other hand, the visualization  
305 capability of the BIM helps decision-makers develop heuristic solutions for managing crises  
306 considering the probabilistic outcomes of the BN inference engine. To this aim, an API is  
307 developed between the BIM platform and BN software. Here, the identified components of the  
308 target system in step 1 are leveraged to map the results of the BN probabilistic inference engine  
309 into their respected 3D BIM component. Then, the "3D component" color-coded visualization  
310 technique (Motamedi et al., 2014) is implemented by assigning a color to every component to  
311 represent their predicted state.


### 312 **4. Model implementation for the medical oxygen system**

313 The proposed hybrid BIM and BN-based emergency disaster management model was  
314 implemented in a general hospital's medical oxygen system to illustrate its applications in the  
315 decision-making process during a crisis. The hospital case was located in Tabriz city, in the  
316 north-west of Iran. This region had experienced severe earthquakes during the last decade. The  
317 area's high seismicity encouraged the research team to develop the proposed model by focusing  
318 on earthquake-induced disasters. The medical oxygen delivery system plays a vital role in  
319 hospitals' functionality (Achour et al., 2014), and it is identified as one of the most vulnerable  
320 systems in the past earthquakes (Dixit et al., 2014). Therefore, the oxygen delivery system of

321 the intensive care unit of the case hospital, as a representative part of the whole system, is  
322 selected as the target utility system of this case study. In the proposed model for the oxygen  
323 delivery system, the user enters the disaster observations and the mitigation measures into the  
324 model and receives the system state's prediction as an output. A detailed explanation of the  
325 model implementation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 326 **4.1 Medical oxygen system fragmentation**


327 The BIM model of the hospital is captured as input. Then, the selected oxygen system of the  
328 hospital case and its specifications (Figure 4-b) were added to the available architectural 3D  
329 BIM model of the hospital (Figure 4-a) to prepare the model for system fragmentation.



330

331 Figure 4. Illustration of the developed BIM model of the case hospital

332 The system fragmentation was conducted for the selected medical oxygen delivery system  
333 based on the COBie dataset. For the target system of the case hospital, five principal  
334 components were identified with their dependencies. Figure 5 illustrates the identified  
335 components and their dependencies. The "PSA Unit" was identified as the primary, and the  
336 "Cryogenic Tank" was recognized as the secondary source of the medical oxygen. The oxygen  
337 flows from the primary or secondary supply to the "Piping System," which delivers the oxygen  
338 to the "Patient Floors." The "Portable Supply" is also added to reflect the portable reserve  
339 oxygen cylinders in the hospital wards.



340

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Figure 5. Medical oxygen system fragmentation

342 **4.2 A thorough risk assessment of the oxygen system**

343 In this case study, due to the lack of systematic data collection in the case hospital, the historical  
 344 data was not reliable to perform the conditional probability estimation algorithms. Therefore,  
 345 a literature-based risk assessment along with the expert knowledge elicitation was carried out  
 346 to recognize the components' deviations and their corresponding consequences. The risk  
 347 assessment procedures of this case study are inspired mainly by the FMEA method. The  
 348 adopted method covers all the potential deviations and their corresponding possible causes and  
 349 consequences of the system components. A total of 18 scientific papers, standards, regulations,  
 350 and guidelines were reviewed for identifying the risks of the target system. Table 1 reflects the  
 351 achieved results of the literature-based risk assessment.

Table 1. The identified risks for the oxygen delivery system of the hospital

<i>Component</i>	<i>Failure Modes</i>	<i>Causes of Failure</i>	<i>Consequences of Failure</i>	<i>Mitigation Measures</i>	<i>References</i>
PSA Unit	Outage of power	Failure of the power supply infrastructure Cyberattacks	Oxygen gas system outage	Using the backup power supply	(Li et al., 2013), (Wang et al., 2015); (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2008); (Cao Wang et al., 2019); (FEMA, 2012)
	Leakage	Under-maintained system	Fire	Regulated maintenance and checking	(Retamales, 2008); (Blasi et al., 2018); (BCGA, 2006b); (Salah et al., 2018); Experts
		Excessive ground acceleration	Reduced gas pressure	Monitoring the system state via the master panel	
Fire	Faulty wirings	The overall outage of the PSA system	Shutting the main valve off in case of fire	(Manes & Rush, 2020); (BCGA, 2006a); (BCGA, 2006b); (NFPA, 2005)	
Cryogenic Tank	Lack of available volume	Misestimation of the oxygen need	Lack of oxygen in the hospital	Estimating the average need Controlling the oxygen level	(BCGA,2006a); (BCGA, 2006b); (NFPA, 2005);
	Leakage from tank	Cracks at the outer and inner surface of the tank	Lack of pressure	Considering the seismic design codes	(Retamales, 2008); (Blasi et al., 2018); (BCGA, 2006b); (Salah et al., 2018); Experts
		Under-maintained system	Fire	Regulated maintenance and checking	
Fire	Heating and smoking	The overall outage of the Cryogenic tank	Shutting the main valve off in case of fire	(Manes & Rush, 2020); (BCGA, 2006a); (BCGA, 2006b); (NFPA, 2005)	
Piping system	Leakage	Improper pipe connections	Fire	Controlling the gas flow and detecting the leak points	(Retamales, 2008); (Blasi et al., 2018); Experts
		Excessive sway of the structure	Lack of gas pressure on the wards	Using a portable supply	
Portable supply	Lack of available supply	Misestimation of the oxygen need	Lack of oxygen in wards	Estimating the average need Controlling the oxygen level	(BCGA,2006a); (BCGA, 2006b); Experts
	Misuse of the supply	Lack of trained staff	Hypoxia in patients	Training staff to manage the crisis	(Charney et al., 2015); (Burke et al., 2014); (Yang et al., 2010); (Johnson & Travis, 2006); (Salevaty et al., 2015)
Patient Floor	Fire	Failures of equipment	Exacerbation of fire due to the presence of oxygen	Shutting the oxygen flow in case of fire	(Manes & Rush, 2020); (BCGA, 2006a); (BCGA, 2006b); (NFPA, 2005)
	Medical gas flow outage	Power supply outage Leakage in the pipes Shutting valves due to emergency	Emergency medical situation	Active area alarm panel Monitoring the patients	(BCGA,2006a); (BCGA, 2006b); (NFPA, 2005); Experts

353

354 After performing the literature-based risk assessment, the experts' domain knowledge was

355 employed in two stages to tune the risk assessment results with the hospitals' existing

356 arrangement. Two clinical engineering experts with more than ten years of experience were

357 contacted to adjust the "PSA Unit," "Cryogenic Tank," and "Piping" components' risks. A


358 senior nurse was also selected to assess the risks of "Patient Floor." Furthermore, another expert  
359 was selected from the disaster management domain for validating the results of risk  
360 assessments. The expert assessments were conducted in the form of one to two hours of  
361 interactive interviews. In the first stage, the experts were asked about parameters that play a  
362 role in the system's behavior. By matching the experts' responses with the identified risks, the  
363 required adjustments were made in the risk assessment. In the second stage, the expert  
364 knowledge was used to justify the relations of different risk factors and their effects on the  
365 system's behavior. For simplifying the process of expert opinion extraction, the indirect  
366 elicitation technique of weighting introduced by Kuhnert et al. (2010) was utilized. In this  
367 technique, the experts were asked to make comments about the parameters' effects and rank  
368 the impacts of parameter variations. Then, the research team evaluated the experts' comments  
369 and made the required justifications. Table 2 represents the justifications made to the risk  
370 assessment results.

Table 2. Expert's justifications on the literature-based risk assessments

<i>Justification type</i>	<i>Literature-based assessment results</i>	<i>Changes made by Experts</i>	<i>Description</i>
Adding a new risk factor	-	Staff Training	Employees' performance depends on the training they receive. Proper training can help them to stay calm and to increase their productivity during a crisis.
Adding a new risk factor	-	Trained Staff Availability	During an earthquake, escape from the place occurs instinctively, and it is proportional to the intensity of the earthquake. Proper staff training can increase the efficiency of personnel during a crisis.
Changing states of risk factor	Productivity (Poor, Moderate, High)	Productivity (Poor, Good)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Backup Productivity (Poor, Moderate, High)	Backup Productivity (Poor, Good)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Gas Flow From Primary Supply (Poor, Moderate, High)	Gas Flow From Primary Supply (Poor, Good)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Gas Flow From Backup Supply (Poor, Moderate, High)	Gas Flow From Backup Supply (Poor, Good)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Gas Flow In Pipes (Emergency, SlightLack, Good)	Gas Flow From Backup Supply (Lack, Normal)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Gas Flow Inpatient floors (Emergency, SlightLack, Good)	Gas Flow Inpatient floors (Lack, Normal)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Medical Gas State Inpatient floor (Emergency, SlightLack, Good)	Medical Gas State Inpatient floor (Emergency, Normal)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Changing states of risk factor	Portable Supply Quality (Poor, Normal, VeryGood)	Portable Supply Quality (Poor, Good)	Considering the three different states of this risk factor, neither will bring any additional analytical benefits, nor will simplify the risk assessment process.
Adding a new risk factor	-	Leakage In Pipes-Gas Flow inpatient floors	The leakage in the pipes will have a direct effect on the gas flow in the patient rooms
Adding a new risk factor	-	UPS Units	Critical wards are equipped with UPS units, and if the city power goes out, these UPS units can supply the need immediately.
Adding a new risk factor	-	City Power Grid	The PSA units mainly work with the city power grid.
Changing a risk factor	Power supply availability	City Power Supply	Power availability relies mainly on the city power supply, and in case of a power outage, UPS systems could fulfill the needs for a short time.

### 372 **4.3 The oxygen system's BN instantiation**

373 The collected information of the system risk factors was mapped into the cause-consequence  
374 BN objects. The objects were linked using the identified relationships between the components  
375 in Section 4.1. The BayesFusion's GeNIe Modeler (BayesFusion, 2020a) was used to develop  
376 the BN. Figure 6 represents the overall structure of the BN model.



377

378

Figure 6. Bayesian Network of the medical oxygen system

379

The BN nodes were categorized into three groups, including chance nodes, system settings, and utility. The chance nodes express the model's uncertain variables like risk factors, which could be observed at any moment of the crisis. These nodes can also capture the decisions of the managers and working teams. The system setting nodes model the system settings and strategies before disaster hits. The utility nodes express the components' performance according to the disaster observations.


384

#### 385 4.4 Model validation

386

The sensitivity analysis was carried out on all the possible cases to evaluate the effects of input changes on the target node of the "Medical Gas State In Patient Floor." The target node was selected due to its importance in the final result of the BN system. Figure 7 illustrates the impacts of the top ten variables on the target node in the form of a Tornado graph. In the Tornado graphs, different model variables are represented by bars, and the length of bars is interpreted as the magnitude of the variable's impact on the output of the target node (Hosseini & Sarder, 2019).

392



393

394 Figure 7. The sensitivity Tornado graph for the normal state of the "Medical Gas State In Patient  
395 Floor"

396 Each bar displayed in Figure 7 represents the impacts of a 30% variation in the value of its  
397 respective variable on the target node. The green bars indicate an increase, and the red bars  
398 demonstrate a decrease in the value of each variable. For example, the original probability of a  
399 normal medical gas state in patient floor is 0.90453, and an increase of 30% in the probability  
400 of the "More than 4 hours" state of the "Portable supply availability" variable (see bar 4 in  
401 Figure 7), would increase the probability of normal medical gas state in patient floor to 0.9102.  
402 On the other hand, a decrease of 30% in the probability of the same bar would decrease the  
403 probability of a normal medical gas state in patient floor to 0.8989. In other words, the  
404 probability of a normal medical gas state in patient floor ranges from 0.8989 to 0.9102 by 30%  
405 variation of the fourth variable plotted in Figure 7. It is concluded that the developed model  
406 responds to the slight variations in the input variables in a sensible manner.


#### 407 4.5 BIM-based visualization

408 The BN and BIM were integrated by the development of an API in the .NET Framework. The  
409 API collects the observed evidence and assigns them to their corresponding nodes on the BN.

410 Then, it utilizes the SIMLE Engine (BayesFusion, 2020b) for updating the system state. Next,  
 411 the updated state of each utility node on the BN is matched with its corresponding BIM object.  
 412 The identified components of the medical oxygen gas system are leveraged to map the BN's  
 413 probabilistic results on the BIM components. Finally, the results were visualized by reflecting  
 414 the components' conditions as color-coded 3D objects in the BIM model. The hospital's  
 415 decision-makers can control the crisis by allocating mitigation measures. The API captures the  
 416 measures by assigning the values on the nodes that the decision is impacting. Then the model  
 417 is recalculated to reflect the effects of the mitigation measures on the system.

#### 418 4.6 A simulated post-earthquake scenario

419 A post-earthquake scenario of the medical gas system was developed based on available data  
 420 from past earthquakes to clarify how the model assists the hospital managers in controlling the  
 421 disaster. The observational data on hospitals' performance in past earthquakes collected by  
 422 Yavari et al. (2010) and the risk assessment data of the oxygen supply system facing the  
 423 earthquakes gathered by Deleris et al. (2006) was the source of inspiration for the development  
 424 of the scenario. The developed scenario is summarized in Figure 8.



426 Figure 8. The post-earthquake scenario for the medical oxygen system

427 In the simulated scenario, an earthquake with a magnitude ( $M_w$ ) of 5 to 6 occurred (See E1 in  
 428 Figure 8), ensuing with a power outage in the city (See E2 in Figure 8). In this situation, the  
 429 PSA Unit will be down until backup power starts to operate, which will take 10 to 15 minutes  
 430 according to the case hospital's current configurations. During these crucial moments, the

431 cryogenic tank is designed to provide the hospital's demand. To identify the system state, the  
 432 hospital manager entered the first and second observations into the model by assigning the  
 433 value on the "Earthquake Intensity" and "City Power Grid" nodes. Figure 9 represents a  
 434 snapshot of a color-coded model before and immediately after an earthquake (after observing  
 435 E1 and E2). Although the PSA unit was identified as the most critical component in the system,  
 436 the backup supply seemed to be able to feed the hospital and fulfill the demand. The red  
 437 rectangles in Figure 9 illustrate the system overview.




(a) Before earthquake

(b) Immediately after earthquake

439  
 440 Figure 9. Visualization of the system state before and after a simulated earthquake  
 441 Simultaneously, the nurses reported the lack of pressure of the oxygen in the central pipelines  
 442 (see E3 in Figure 8). The third evidence was entered into the system. The model captures this  
 443 evidence by assigning the value on the "Gas Flow In Patient Floor" node in the network and  
 444 runs the inference engine to update the system state considering the new observation. Figure  
 445 10-a represents the system state after the new observation, and the red rectangle illustrates the  
 446 system overview.  
 447 By overviewing the system state, the manager identified the critical state of the patient floor  
 448 (see C1 in Figure 8); therefore, two mitigation measures of calling for the extra portable oxygen  
 449 supply from the supplier and recalling the trained staff were allocated to control the crisis. The  
 450 model captures the allocated mitigation measures by assigning values on the "Trained Staff


451 Availability" and "Portable Supply Availability" nodes on the network. The manager evaluated  
452 the mitigations' effectiveness by running the model and observing the updated system state,  
453 considering the allocated measures. Figure 10-b represents the system state after performing  
454 the mitigation measures. The adopted measures lead to an increase in the "Patient Floor  
455 Performance" to 95.5% (see the red rectangle of the "System Overview" in Figure 10-b).  
456 Additionally, probabilistic information of the system overview indicated a significant reduction  
457 of performance in the "Cryogenic Tank" and "Piping System." The manager analyzed the  
458 detailed probabilistic information of the components' states (see the red rectangle of the  
459 "Detailed System State" in Figure 10-b) and distinguished the pipe or tank leakage as the two  
460 probable consequences (See C2 and C3 in Figure 8).

461 Hence, the maintenance team was called to conduct diagnosis procedures. The maintenance  
462 team used the master alarm panel to check whether the backup supply was feeding the hospital,  
463 and a reduction in the gas flow in pipes was detected (See E4 in Figure 8). The fourth evidence  
464 was entered into the system. This evidence was assigned on the "Gas Flow in Pipes" node, and  
465 then the system states were updated. Figure 10-c represents the system state considering all the  
466 observed evidence. As shown in Figure 10-c, the backup supply leakage was more probable  
467 than the pipe leakage. Accordingly, the manager decided to request emergency maintenance  
468 for the cryogenic tank.



(a) After observing third evidence

(c) After observing fourth evidence



(b) After allocating the measures

470

471

Figure 10. Visualization of the system state

472 **4.7 Results and discussion**

473 Based on Figure 7, the occurrence of the fire in the patient floors was recognized as the most  
 474 disruptive earthquake-induced consequence for the system. Moreover, the portable reserve  
 475 supply was identified as one of the most sensitive factors that influenced the medical gas state

476 on the patient floors. As it is represented, the bars associated with the reserve supplies are  
477 among the highest rank in the Tornado graph (see bars 2, 4, 5, 8, and 10 in Figure 7). This  
478 finding implies the importance of the redundancy of the resources in the resilience of the  
479 systems. By examining the effect of different variables with respect to their contribution to the  
480 medical gas state in patient floors, decision-makers can devise necessary strategies to optimize  
481 the resiliency of their systems.

482 Implementation of the model in the case hospital revealed the model capabilities in emergency  
483 management and root cause analysis. Immediately after the earthquake, the performance of the  
484 PSA unit was significantly reduced, which was rooted in the city power outage. The PSA units  
485 are designed to work with the city power grid, and the outage of power reduced its performance  
486 from 87.4% to 7.1% in the simulated scenario. By considering the explicit (i.e., power outage)  
487 and implicit (i.e., increased chances of earthquake-induced failures such as pipe or tank  
488 leakage) disaster impacts, the proposed model reduced the performance of other components  
489 (see the red rectangle of Figure 9-b). The model reduced the patient floor state to 65% by  
490 observing the third evidence from the nurses. In this situation, some of the patients might be  
491 experiencing hypoxia. The proposed model helped the manager identify the emergency and  
492 allocate the measures to control the crisis. The model evaluated the allocated measures to be  
493 effective in increasing the patients' status to 95.5%. Moreover, the model's probabilistic  
494 information helped the manager conduct a root cause analysis of the performance reduction in  
495 the second stage of disaster management. Although the pipe leakage might seem more probable  
496 at first sight, the model predicted the same chance of leakage in the cryogenic tank and piping  
497 system (see Figure 10-b). By collecting the fourth evidence from the system behavior, the  
498 model predicted the tank leakage to be more probable than the pipe leakage (see Figure 10-c).  
499 Implementation of the model helped the manager consider the probability of tank leakage,  
500 which might be overlooked in the best practices of the case hospital in the same situations.

## 501 **5. Conclusions**

502 Disasters are threatening societies, and health infrastructures play a vital role in overcoming  
503 these threats. The development of a decision support system for facilitating the immediate  
504 responses after disasters is a surging demand. This research proposed a novel decision support  
505 model by synthesizing the BN and BIM capabilities to respond to the existing demand. The  
506 BN's probabilistic capabilities were utilized for analyzing the states of the hospital's utility  
507 systems during the disaster. Meanwhile, the object-oriented and 3D visualization capabilities  
508 of the BIM was employed to facilitate risk-informed decision making. The proposed model  
509 was implemented in a hospital case to investigate its capabilities and demonstrate how it can  
510 visually analyze the oxygen delivery system after an earthquake. The proposed model has  
511 several distinguishing features that can improve the process of making urgent decisions during  
512 a crisis. Integration of the BIM and BN in the model architecture endows the user to visually  
513 evaluate the utility system states. Besides the model's capability to simulate the system after  
514 disasters, a novel capability is introduced that enables decision-makers to model the system  
515 immediately after the disaster. This capability would help the decision-makers investigate  
516 different disaster response strategies, assess the effectiveness of viable measures, and allocate  
517 the planned strategies optimally. Moreover, the COBie standard is used for constructing BN  
518 objects, accelerating the BN structure development, and reducing the burden of the process.

519 This study is subject to certain limitations. Due to the lack of data about the system behavior  
520 during the disaster and the lack of pragmatic solutions to collect such data, the case study limits  
521 its scope to the available knowledge in literature and experts' experience. In the case study, the  
522 interdependence of systems is neglected, and the scope is limited to a specific utility system.  
523 Moreover, the evidence observations in the case study are limited to the operational teams'  
524 perception of disaster events. Future research is required to combat the limitations of this study.  
525 Further case studies are necessary to develop BN for other utility systems and consider the

526 interdependent relationships of these systems. A systematic data collection method needs to be  
527 developed to provide the automated BN instantiation requirement for the hospital utility  
528 systems. Moreover, COBie datasets and facility management systems' databases can be  
529 leveraged to develop an automated BN instantiation method. Finally, the building facility  
530 management systems and equipment sensors' data can be utilized to investigate the disaster  
531 observations and update the system state automatically.

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